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SOCIAL WELFARE INTEREST GROUPS:
AN UNDERUTILIZED RESOURCE
Fred Barbaro,
Adelphi University School of Social Work
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the need for increased political ac-
tivity by the professional social work community in order
to enhance its own status and to promote the growth of the
social welfare institutions required by our clientele. It
is not a polemic but an attempt to bare the relationship
between social welfare bureaucracies and the political
system. The results of a study on interest group behavior
are reported. Social workers, as an interest group, can
be more effective in advancing the goals of the profession
if they have a better understanding of the political pro-
cess and thereby maximize the impact of their limited
resources.
Form has noted that there has been an impressive growth in
welfare institutions in America, despite the political re-
ticence of welfare professionals and the political apathy
of their clientele.1 He attributes the growth to world-
wide and domestic pressures articulated by many poorly
organized groups that recognized that the existing mecha-
nisms could not address the problems facing society. Once
the bureaucracies were created to administer the programs,
professional social workers validated the services by
training their personnel in schools of social work and by
staffing the agencies but then proceeded to "strike a
neutral pose" in line with traditional norms governing
professional behavior. 2
A contemporary view of social services in an industrial
society equates expanded programs with productivity
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increases, and a rise in living standards. Services are
not seen as transitory but necessary to the functioning of
a modern society. 3 In this sense they are supportive of
the social and economic order but are nevertheless under
attack by conservative groups that purport to have similar
goals. In a rapidly expanding economy, social services
may keep abreast of expansion in other areas but during
periods of slow growth or stagnation, they are prime tar-
gets for curtailment. Neutrality at that time may be con-
sistent with one's view of professional role but is it
consistent with client need or even professional self-
interest? I think not.
This paper addresses the need for political activity by the
professional community. It is not a polemic but an attempt
to bare the relationship between social welfare bureaucra-
cies and the political system, and to increase our under-
standing of the role that interest groups play in the
process. The latter objective is achieved by reporting
the results of a study conducted on social welfare interest
groups. While the professional association has increased
its political activity of late, some observers have ex-
pressed the view that the majority of social workers will
not participate. Form shares this view for he believes
that the profession "tends to breed a type that is timid,
conservative, unimaginative, and easily co-opted by the
tough-minded."4 At best this view is impressionistic and
it is important to keep in mind that the same things were
once said about teachers. Few would now characterize
teachers and their associations as apolitical and there is
no reason to believe that social workers could not change
their image if they were convinced that it was in their
best interest to do so.
A Pluralist Perspective of the Political System
Zald's contribution to a "sociology of community organiza-
tion"5 is helpful in demonstrating how agencies shape pro-
fessional practice and how in turn their activities are
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curtailed by internal and external events. The political
science literature adds to these insights by spelling out
the role of bureaucracies in political decision-making
which not only includes their clientele but other actors
and interest groups as well. From the pluralist's per-
spective,6 the bureaucracies share power with other actors
while they continually strive for a state of autonomy. No
single elite dominates the governmental or political sys-
tem. The system is seen as being vigorously competitive
with numerous contestants vying against one another for the
prizes that are an out-growth of political activity.
Sayre and Kaufman noted that there are a multiplicity of
decision centers consisting of two parts: "A 'core group'
at the center, invested by the rules with the formal
authority to legitimize decisions .... and a constellation of
'satellite groups' seeking to influence the authoritative
issuances of the core group.'7 Interest groups are satel-
lite groups, in constant competition or in alliances with
each other, pressing their claims on the core groups pre-
siding over the decision centers of the general organs of
government.
Utilizing an example of a welfare department in a large
city, this pluralistic view of decision-making may be
schematically stated as depicted in Figure I. This para-
digm, with a few modifications, can be replicated for other
subsystems of the political system like housing or educa-
tion. While no single elitist group rules over all these
subsystems, each subsystem attracts its own elites that
specialize in that area of interest. Ordinarily these
elites govern without much interference from outsiders.
However, when a good deal of conflict is generated over a
policy issue, decision-making is opened to public view and
new actors become involved. Political actors may have
legal authority to intervene or exercise their influence
informally. Their roles are modified by the rules of the
system which enhance the competition among them and confer
advantages to some and not to others. The rules include:
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1. State and Federal Constitution
2. State and Federal Agency rules and regulations
3. State and Federal Court decisions
4. State and Federal statutes
5. Customs or informal arrangements.
To maintain a degree of autonomy in this highly competitive
atmosphere, bureaucratic officials seek allies to temper
the intrusion of other actors (especially those in the
executive and legislative branches) in their internal
affairs. Rourke states:
A first and fundamental source of power for ad-
ministrative agencies in American society is
their ability to attract outside support.
Strength in a constituence is no less an asset
for an American administrator than it is for a
politician, and some agencies have succeeded in
building outside support as formidable as that
of any political organization. The lack of such
support severely circumscribes the ability of an
agency to achieve its goals, and may even threaten
its survival as an organization.9
The clientele of an agency, that is, groups whose interests
are strongly affected by an agency's programslO are natural
sources of support and opposition. Interest groups some-
times prefer to work in the bureaucratic rather than the
legislative arena where they may have less influence.
Bureaucrats also have discretion in administering their
programs due to the ambiguous language of some legislation
and the discretionary powers specifically granted to agency
officials by the legislature.11 Therefore, groups that are
interested in the implementation of programs must have in-
fluence at the bureaucratic level.
While the administrative power evolves from technical
knowledge, expertise, and sources other than mobilized in-
terest groups, these groups do provide a unique source of
support. Sharkansky describes interest group aid as follows:
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.... First, the group can take a position on an
issue which coincides with a position held by
administrators, but which administrators cannot
take publicly because it would offend their
chief executive or important members of the
legislature. Second, interest groups can sup-
port an agency's request for funds or statutory
authority with the executive and the legislature
or can help the agency resist undesirable direc-
tives from the executive or the legislature. An
interest group can make an argument and build
public support for a position that cannot be
articulated by an administrator who is currently
the target of executive or legislative hostility. "1 2
Study Design
A definition of terms is essential before one embarks on a
study of interest groups. According to Truman, an interest
group "refers to any group that, on the basis of one or
more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other
groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance or
enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the
shared attitudes.1 3 This definition is broad and designed
to be consistent with his attempt to explain everything
that happens in the political system in terms of groups.
If "shared attitudes" become the significant criteria, then
everyone can be theoretically affiliated with an interest
group - government officials, elected leaders, the unorgan-
ized, and the like.
Eckstein calls this approach to the study of political
behavior metaphysical:
As used by its more extravagant exponents, group
theory tends indeed to come nothing more than a
language, based on the plausible but arbitrary
metaphysic that in politics the ultimate "real",
the component alike of individuals and institutions,
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the unit which really "acts" and underlies
ideas, is the group - not individuals,
interactions, institutions, or larger poli-
tical systems. Nothing can escape the
clutches of this metaphysics if only one
stretches it far enough, but precisely
because of this nothing is illuminated by
it either.1
4
Schattschneider agrees with this assessment and attempts to
set boundaries or limit the scope of the subject in order
to distinguish it from other subjects. He begins by dif-
ferentiating between public and special interests. The
former "refers to general or common interests shared by
all or by substantially all members of the community.15
This is consistent with the "community of interest" thesis,
a requirement of a democratic society. The implication of
special interests is that only a few people or a faction of
the community share that interest.1 6 If this distinction
is not made and attempts are made to explain everything in
terms of special interests, the subject loses its boun-
daries and could lead to the conclusion that people have a
special interest in the public interest.
The next step is to limit the subject even further.
Schattschneider suggests that the field of study should be
the organized, special interest groups and "leave the rest
to someone else".17 The advantages of this approach are
obvious; they are known, identifiable and recognized and
they are all exclusive. The study of the subject becomes
manageable if the researcher focuses on those groups with
a demnstrated interest in politics evidenced by formal
organizations having memberships, bylaws and officers.
This view does not attempt to explain all political
behavior nor does it assume that all interests are articu-
lated. Pressure group politics "makes sense only as the
political instrument of a segment of the community. It
gets results by being selective and biased; if everyone
-4-23-
got into the act the unique advantages of this form of or-
ganization would be destroyed, for it is possible that if
all interests could be mobilized the results would be a
stalemate. "18
It is possible to further refine the definition of in-
terest groups by distinguishing them from pressure groups
and attempting to classify them by objective characteris-
tics or by shared attitudes. This exercise may prove pro-
ductive in other studies but not this one. The focus sug-
gested by Schattschneider - the formally organized, special
interest group - was the unit of observation in this study.
Arriving at a definition of interest groups, it now became
necessary to observe their political activity. The years
between 1968 and 1972 in New York City were chosen. Four
issues with educational and broad social welfare concerns
were selected and each conflict was contested in a dif-
ferent arena (e.g., the legislature, the courts). The
issues remained on the public agenda for a long period of
time, thereby giving groups an opportunity to become in-
volved if they chose to do so.
In keeping with Schattschneider's suggestion, the interest
groups chosen for study had the following characteristics:
1. They were formally organized and exhibited a degree
of stability and cohesiveness over time (at least
one year). Ad hoc groups were not considered.
2. They all demonstrated an interest in the issues
based on past behavior.
3. They were citywide organizations.
In all, nineteen organizations19 were chosen that could be
categorized as civic, educational, religious, civil rights,
ethnic or economic groups. Some would fit comfortably
under more than one designation. Attempts were made to
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get a broad representation of organizations, but it is not
known if they are truly representative of all interest
groups in the city. If the selection of a representative
sample was attempted, important groups who were intimately
involved in the incidents being studied may have been
eliminated.
The data were gathered from interviews with the staffs of
the interest groups which usually involved more than a
single visit to each agency and more than one staff member
being interviewed. In addition, interviews were conducted
with businessmen, staff members of public agencies, union
officials, lobbyists, attorneys, city employees, and mem-
bers of the state legislature. An unstructured open-ended
schedule was used. Additional data were gathered by re-
viewing agency reports, memoranda, pamphlets, and press
releases.
Questions
Questions that were explored in the study include:
Do interests inevitably lead to political activity? Under
what circumstances do groups become involved or refrain
from becoming involved in issues? What are the determining
factors that lead groups to work in one decision-making
arena as opposed to others? Why do some groups specialize
while others choose targets of opportunity? What is the
nature of their relationship with other groups and how does
the new association affect their autonomy? What tactics do
groups use to gain access to decision-makers and decision-
making centers? With what frequency and degree of inten-
sity? What factors determine the tactics? Is the activity
of any group roughly proportional to its stake in the issue?
Do economic groups tend to promote their interests with
greater intensity and frequency than ideological groups?
Findings
A summary of the findings follows:
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Determinants of Interest Group Activity
Table I lists the nineteen interest groups and their in-
volvement or lack of involvement in the four incidents
studied. Involvement here is judged to be significant
activity. Effectiveness is not a criterion, but a press
release or letter to a legislator is not enough to qualify.
A quick glance at the table suggests certain patterns de-
veloping. Only half the groups were' involved in any one
of the incidents under study. But these are not signifi-
cant factors in themselves, and additional probing is
necessary to give meaning to the table. It is clear, how-
ever, that no one factor determined the course of partici-
pation for all groups, and the decision to become involved
or to refrain from such involvement was based on many
factors that will be explored below.
Economic interests engendered a stronger response than
educational or civil rights concerns among the interest
groups.
A case could be made for almost all groups having an equal
stake in the issues based on their professed aims as or-
ganizations. But obviously intervening factors curbed
the activities of some of the groups. Nevertheless, the
economic groups overcame the barriers barring participation
of other groups and made it their business to become
involved.
Interest groups intervention is determined by the nature of
the issue as perceived by the group and a desire to main-
tain a consistent organizational self-image.
One of the factors that depressed activity was the nature
of the issue. If conflict was inevitable, and disruption
possible, and the issue is perceived in that manner, some
groups remain on the sidelines. They do so for the
following reasons:
First, there is the problem of controversy. Some groups
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established themselves as alternatives to conflict groups
and resist all pressures to become "militant" or take a
stand on controversial issues. They feel that their ef-
fectiveness is compromised when they are perceived by their
target groups as being controversial. Their aim is to gain
concessions from the system as it is and to take advantage
of the changes brought about by other groups.
Second, there are groups that are not repulsed by contro-
versy as such but who have few of the tools with which to
affect the outcome of a contest. This is not a matter of
resources but a choice of operating styles.
Internal conflict over an issue limits both an organiza-
tion's ability to respond and the intensity of its activity.
The amount of organizational resources had little impact on
a group's decision to become involved in an issue.
Resources are generally considered to be a major determi-
nant of interest group activity. But the evidence here in-
dicates that the lack of resources had little impact on the
decision to enter or not to enter the fray.
Intensity of activity is determined by whether a group is a
single purpose or multi-purpose organization and whether
its posture is defensive or offensive.
Single purpose and multi-purpose groups could be seen as
synonyms for primary and secondary interests, and in a
sense they are. However, the concept of objective interest
as opposed to perceived interest comes into play. Objec-
tively most of the groups had a primary interest in the
issue, but they did not all see it that way. Those or-
ganizations that perceive the issue as one of many cur-
tailed their activity, and the intensity with which they
participated accordingly.
Intensity of activity is also related to whether groups
are offensive or defensive. The defensive groups felt
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they were under attack and protected their interests in
every arena.
The choice of arenas by interest groups is determined by
an organization's operating style and its desire not to
break with traditional roles; the dominance of one profes-
sional group with its selective perspective on issues and
strateqies; and lack of leadership sophistication in more
than one arena.
Interest Group Tactics
The choice of tactics is directly related to a group's in-
fluence in the political system as well as other factors
like leadership sophistication, organizational style, rules
of the arena, and resources.
Many of the factors that determined group involvement in
particular arenas have a bearing on the tactics used by
groups. An organization will use tactics that are consis-
tent with its self-image. The lack of resources will eli-
minate some options. Some arenas will curb the use of
tactics that are acceptable in other arenas. And leader-
ship sophistication will account for the variety and
effectiveness of the tactics used.
Over the years some groups have developed relationships
with governmental bodies that have resulted in consultation
rights. These groups by and large do not feel estranged
from the system. But the sixties saw the introduction of
new groups to the political system whose interests were not
always represented before. These groups did not share the
confidence implied by the behavior of other groups regar-
ding the system's responsiveness. Therefore, their tactics
were designed to gain access to decision centers barred to
them in the past or to attempt structural changes that
would not perpetuate their inferior political status.
In response to the civil rights street demonstrations,
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government provided the resources to enable new groups to
be formed, thus revealing a sometimes overlooked relation-
ship between interest groups and decision-making centers.
Interest groups are instrumental in establishing new
policies and new policies lead to the formation of new
interest groups.
Non-governmental interest groups do not constitute a
countervailing force to governmental interest groups.
The non-governmental interest groups were not a significant
political force on major issues. Although they collec-
tively possessed greater resources, they were too frag-
mented to be effective. As autonomous units they are
dealt with individually and easily handled. Acting alone,
they are overly conscious of their lack of resources when
seeking to influence amulti-billion dollar agency or a
prestigious legislative body.
The big issues are therefore left to the big actors - the
United Federation of Teachers, the large bureaucracies,
City Hall, and the State Legislature. The blacks and
Puerto Ricans found themselves in this company only be-
cause their existing groups coalesced, and they opened up
participation to the unaffiliated. This move gave them
parity in street demonstrations, but they were less
successful in other arenas.
Almost without exception the groups were led by intelligent,
sophisticated people who worked long hours and were com-
mitted to organizational goals. They ranged programmati-
cally from those who dabbled in everything to those who
were so planful that they could not react organizationally
to changing situations. The expectation was that each of
the little projects that consumed their time and resources
were cumulative and that together they affected larger
policy areas. That conclusion cannot be drawn from the
evidence gathered in this study, but one thing is clear,
non-governmental interest groups did not constitute a
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countervailing force to governmental interest groups,
either in New York City or in Albany. Their activities
can be justified in any number of ways, but the field is
controlled by the big actors.
Conclusion
For our purposes, interest groups can be seen as falling
into the following categories:
a. Public and private agencies
b. Social welfare educators
c. Social welfare professional organizations
d. Client groups
e. Groups whose main interest is other than
social welfare
Political activity by social workers usually involves the
first three categories but the latter two are less fre-
quently utilized. The findings in and by themselves do not
offer a blueprint for interest group mobilization, but they
do offer clues concerning their behavior that agency execu-
tives can exploit.
This strategy is not without its perils. There is a legi-
timate concern that control over agency programs or the
appointment of key personnel will be lost in exchange for
interest groups support. Some agency executives have re-
linquished some control or have granted interest groups
veto power over the appointment of some personnel2 0 but
the preponderance of evidence indicates that administrators
dominate these relationships.2 1 While any strategy is
accompanied by risks, inaction can hardly be considered
void of hazards. Year after year aspiring politicians
advance their careers by attacking welfare and social ser-
vice programs while agency administrators stand alone in
the political arena whispering their denials. Both agencies
and clients lose under these conditions.
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APPENDIX I
Figure 1
A PLURALIST VIEW OF DECISION-MAKING
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APPENDIX II
Table 1
INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC ISSUES
Organizations
Anti-Defamation League
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
ASPIRA
Citizens Committee for
Children
Community Service Society
Council Against Poverty
Brownsville Corporation
Haryou-Act
MPiD
United Bronx Parents
Council of Supervisors
and Administrators
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense
Fund-Legal Action Center
New York Civil Liberties
Union
Puerto Rican Forum
Puerto Rican Educators
Public Education Association
United Federation of Teachers
United Parents Association
Issue Issue Issue Issue
I II III IV
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No Yes No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
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No
Yes
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Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
